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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
In order to be able to play, cheating is not allowed; the basic principle
of free competition requires that the specific competitive act not be in
conflict with the justification of freedom of competition; central to this
justification is the possibility that competition offers for guaranteeing the
success of those products that are better, and as judged by the consumers
through their manifest preference for certain goods in the satisfaction of
their needs.'
Introduction
Honduran legislation contains two different regulations on
disloyal competition: a) disloyal competition under Articles 425 et
seq. of the Honduran Commercial Code of 1950; and b) disloyal
competition under the Proposed Law for the Promotion and
Protection of Competition (hereinafter Proposed Law) now being
debated in Congress.
Although both regulations are intimately related, substantial
differences exist. The Proposed Law specifies that it applies to the
same types of factual situations as those of disloyal competition
regulated by the Commercial Code. This is true beyond the
procedural point of view. On the one hand, resolution of problems of
disloyal competition under the Commercial Code requires that the
rules of civil procedure be applied. On the other hand, in cases of
disloyal competition under the Proposed Law, an administrative
proceeding before the Institute for the Promotion and Protection of
Competition is applied.
There also exists in both laws a difference between the parties
that are authorized to exercise the respective actions. Under the
Commercial Code, only merchants or merchant associations are
entitled to act. In contrast, under the Proposed Law the government
or any natural or juridic person affected by anti-competitive acts has a
right of action. The interest protected by the Commercial Code is the
enterprise of the merchant, while the Proposed Law protects the
market place and therefore, the national economy, and all persons
1. TULIo ASCARELLI, TEORIA DE LA CONCURRENCIA Y DE LOS BIENES
INMATERIALES. 37 (Spanish translation of Verdera and Sudrez-Llanos, Ed. Bosch,
Barcelona 1970).
2. Under Article 644 of the Honduran Commercial Code, an enterprise is the
coordinated aggregate of labor, material and inmaterial elements to offer to the public
with the purpose of obtaining a gain, goods or services, it being considered a movable
good under Article 646 of the aforesaid Code, operated by a merchant who is its
titular head though not necessarily its owner the term "merchant" includes both
natural as juridic persons). See Laureano F. Gutidrrez Falla, Derecho Mercantil Vol.1
LA EMPRESA. (Editorial Astrea, Buenos Aires 1985).
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who are directly or indirectly affected by illegal activities in said
market.
Notwithstanding, in both cases, acts of disloyal competition are
considered by the Penal Code as felonies and are subject to
prosecution under the Code of Criminal Proceedings.
I. Disloyal Competition in the Commercial Code
Article 425 of the Honduran Commercial Code defines disloyal
competition as "acts executed by a merchant to improperly attract the
clientele of another merchant." Under the Commercial Code,
disloyal competition refers to merchants. Accordingly, the juridically
protected interest is the merchant's enterprise with its "aviamiento"
(roughly translated as good will). In addition, the Commercial Code
provides remedies against acts executed by another merchant that
may improperly attract the merchant's clientele. Only merchants
whose clients were affected by disloyal acts of the infracting merchant
may exercise these remedies.
Upon analysis of the Commercial Code's various regulatory
effects, one must conclude that it is a typical example of the
individualistic, professional or corporate doctrine of disloyal
competition3 found in the legislation and doctrines of the early
twentieth century. At the time, the Commercial Code was viewed as
a set of rules intended to resolve the conflicts that arose between
direct competitors whose forbidden acts were executed within a
framework of direct competition. Only merchants were permitted to
act in cases of disloyal competition. Illicit competition was considered
a violation of the subjective rights of the merchant."
Article 426 of the Honduran Commercial Code could raise
doubts about the conclusions stated above. Article 426 provides:
When acts of disloyal competition damage the interests of a
professional group, the action corresponds not only to those
directly affected, but also to the respective professional
associations or chambers of commerce and industries.
Interpreting a similar rule of the German Law of June 7, 1909,
German jurisprudence established the principle that the repression of
disloyal competition should also protect the consumer public against
3. The Proposed Law, which also contains rules of disloyal competition, applies
the more modem doctrine of the social model (see section II).
4. See Rafael Acevedo, El Modelo de la Competencia Basado en la Eficiencia de
las Propias Prestaciones y la Publicidad Desleal. R.D.C.O., BUENOS AIRES, 183, afio
31, June-September 1998 at 495-496.
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acts that could affect it In applying this doctrine, the German Law
on Disloyal Competition of June 21, 1967 permitted the consumer
associations to act in cases of publicity that were deceptive or
contained false representations and similar acts.
We believe this interpretation would not be applicable under the
Honduran Commercial Code for two fundamental reasons:
1. The right of consumers to act against deceptive advertising,
false representations and similar publicity is contained in the
Consumer Protection Law (Decree #41-89 of April 7, 1989, which
prohibits illicit publicity in the broadest sense), guaranteeing that
consumers receive the goods or services that correspond to the price
paid.6
2. The plain language of the Commercial Code, taken in its
full context, clearly indicates that disloyal competition only applies to
merchants.
II. Definition of Disloyal Competition in the Honduran
Commercial Code
As stated above, disloyal competition is institutionally regulated
in Article 425 et seq. of the Honduran Commercial Code. As a result,
the Honduran approach is similar to the category of laws that
specifically regulate disloyal competition. In contrast, France does
not expressly regulate disloyal competition, but permits consumers to
seek relief under the general rule of extracontractual liability.
In regulating disloyal competition, the Honduran Commercial
Code follows the same approach as that of Italy and Germany. The
approach sets forth a list of illustrative factual situations not intended
to exhaust all possible scenarios. In addition, each provides a general
definition that tries to embrace all the possible violations of disloyal
competition in a deliberately generic form. This approach permits the
inclusion of those factual situations not specifically described in
Article 425, and others that are unforeseeable: "as the malice of the
disloyal competitor is very ardent and his fantasy is always rich in new
discoveries."7
5. See Consuelo Gachama, La Competencia Desleal, EDITORIAL TEMIs, Bogot6,
Colombia (1982) at 103.
6. See Laureano F. Gutitrrez Falla, La Publicidad Ilicita y la Competencia
Desleal a la Luz del Derecho Comunitario Europeo, R.D.C.O., BUENOS AIRES,
129/141, January-June 1991, at 145, reprinted in El Nuevo Derecho Mercantil y el
Derecho del Consumidor, IMPRENTA DEMOGRAFIC, S. de R.L., Tegucigalpa, M.D.C.
(1999) at 99.
7. Francisco Messineo, Manual de Derecho Civil y Comercial, (Traducci6n de
Santiago Sentis Milendo, EDICIONES JURiDICAS EUROPA-AMtRICA, Buenos Aires
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Article 425 of the Honduran Commercial Code begins by
providing that "[d]isloyal competition is considered the execution by
a merchant of acts that improperly attract clientele (of another
merchant)." Four general categories are enumerated:8
I) Deception of the public in general, or of particular persons.
II) Directly damaging another merchant, without violating
contractual obligations with same.
III) Directly damaging another merchant by breach of contracts.
IV) Any similar act that directly or indirectly deviates the
clientele of another merchant.
The analysis of Article 425 of the Commercial Code results in the
following conclusions:
III. Legitimated Subjects
Article 425 of the Commercial Code defines, in precise terms, the
active and passive subjects of disloyal competition. In a typical
scenario, a merchant improperly attracts the clientele of another
merchant. Therefore, the active and passive subjects of disloyal
competition are both merchants. This includes, by virtue of Article
426 of the Commercial Code, merchant associations or chambers of
commerce and industry. In all cases, the juridically protected interest
is the merchant's enterprise.
IV. Field of Application
Honduran legislation clearly distinguishes between acts of
disloyal competition, which are those defined in Article 425 of the
Commercial Code, and acts which prejudice the free circulation of
goods and services in the market. The latter are covered by
"competition law," which is the subject matter of the Proposed Law.
According to Champaud, there are substantial differences
between the law that regulates disloyal competition and the law that
regulates competition.' The source of the former is found in
commercial deontology; the action for disloyal competition is of a
disciplinary nature. In contrast, the sources of the latter are foreign to
commercial law and beyond the limits of private law. Instead, far
from being the expression of the will of the merchant, as is the private
right of a merchant when confronted with disloyal competition, it not
1971, T.VI) at 576.
8. Article 425 sets forth various examples for each category.
9. C1 Les sources du droit de la concurrence au regard du droit commercial et
des autres branches du droit commercial en France en etude en honneur de L. Houin,
p.60 ss, quoted IN REF. INT. Du DROIT ECONOMIQUE, T. 0-198, at 25.
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only assures free competition of enterprises, it forces them to compete
effectively.
Honduran legislation follows the principle stated above and
distinguishes between disloyal competition, which is regulated by the
Commercial Code and private law, from the "law of competition,"
which is of a public nature and which guarantees the free circulation
of goods and services in the market. The law of competition forbids
so-called monopolistic and other restrictive practices, which have
been rendered illegal by Article 339 of the Honduran Constitution
(and also the Proposed Law) as well as in treaties such as GATT. 1° In
addition, Article 713 of the Commercial Code forces merchants who
have concessions, authorizations, or permits to transact business with
the public, or are otherwise able control the price of merchandise or
services, to contract with consumers and comply with the Consumer
Protection Law and its Regulation.
V. Type of Activity
The third conclusion that must be reached in analyzing Article
425 of the Commercial Code is what type of activity constitutes
disloyal competition.
According to Garrigues:
[C]ompetition means, in general, coincidence or concurrence
(this is the French and Italian word) in the desire to obtain ...
the same thing as another party at the same time. When the
object is economic, we are in the field of commercial
competition, which may be defined as the independent activity
of various enterprises to obtain, each one, in the market, the
largest number of contracts with the same clientele, offering the
most favorable prices, qualities or contractual conditions. The
basis of competition is the freedom of economic activity....
Honduras lives, at this date, in an economic regime ruled by the
10. By Decree 17/94 of April 13, 1994, the Honduran Congress approved the
admission of Honduras to the General Accord on Customs Duties and Commerce
(GATT).
By Decree 177-94 of December 1994, it approved the final "Acta de la Ronda
de Uruguay de Negociaciones Comerciales Multinacionales" of April 15, 1994,
which includes the Resolution to apply Article VI of GATT.
Article 2 of said Resolution prohibits dumping, which is typified in Section 2.1
as the act which: "introduces products in the market of another country at a lesser
price than their normal value, when its exportation price upon being exported
from one country to another, is less than the comparable price, in the course of
normal commercial operations, of a similar product."
The Resolution later explains the application of the rule in different
situations.
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principles of market economy based on the freedom to compete,
which entails the possibility all merchants have to obtain the
largest number of clients, even on the basis of deviating the
clients of another competitor by following the "rules of the
game.""
Obviously, disloyal competition is one of the limits to the
fundamental principle of freedom to compete, prohibited to the
benefit of the merchants themselves against abusive acts of other
merchants. Following Acevedo, the object is to preserve a
competitive system whereby merchants, through their own initiative,
attempt to attract clients through strategies that do not imply availing
themselves of the prestige or the results of the efforts of a third party,
and which do not alter the consumers' rational process to reach their
decisions.'2
How does the Commercial Code structure this prohibition?
Article 425 of the Commercial Code clearly states that disloyal
competition consists of the execution by merchants of acts intended to
improperly attract the clientele of another merchant.
To interpret this principle, it is necessary to determine the legal
meaning of the word "clientele." Further, it must be determined if
clientele can be a "commodity" of ownership and thus an absolute
right of a merchant. 3 Authors such as Vivante 4 considered clientele
to be an object of personal property of the merchant and protected by
law. Thus, the term "aviamiento"" is the equivalent of clientele.
To date, this explanation is unacceptable. Authors such as
Ascarelli'6 state:
11. Curso de Derecho Mercantil, EDITORIAL IMPRENTA AGUIRRE, (5a ed.,
Madrid 1968) at 196.
12. See Acevedo, supra note 4, at 500.
13. See Laureano F. Guti6rrez Falla, El Derecho Mercantil y el Derecho del
Consumidor. El Consumidor y la Clientela, ANUARIO DE DERECHO COMERCIAL,
Montevideo, Uruguay, December 1993, at 97, reprinted in EL NUEVO DERECHO
MERCANTIL Y EL DERECHO DEL CONSUMIDOR at 83.
14. C6sar, La Propieta commercialle della clientela, RIv. DIR. COM. 1930, Tomo
XXVIII at 1.
15. The Exposici6n de Motivos of the Honduran Commercial Code defines
"aviamiento" when it states that it has already been indicated that the enterprise is, by
its own nature, an aggregate of elements. The adequate combination of same to be
able to comply with the object of the enterprise is the "aviamiento", i.e. the aptitude
of the enterprise to obtain the ends for which it was created. See Laureano F.
Gutidrrez Falla. Derecho Mercantil, LA EMPRESA, V.1, (Editorial Astrea, Buenos
Aires, 1985) at 42.
16. TULIo, INICIACION AL ESTUDIO DEL DERECHO MERCANTIL, (Evelio Verdera
y Tuelles translation, Editorial Bosch, Barcelona) at 292.
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[c]lientele does not constitute a good, an object of personal
property (which does not mean it does not have a value); it is a
factual situation, that results from the elements that compose
the "aviamiento" and which becomes a 'factor of same. Those
who consider that the clientele is an inmaterial good, an object
of personal property, forget the freedom to compete; if the
clientele were an object of absolute right, this would mean that
it would be protected against all acts of competition (whatever
those may be). To reply, as has been replied before, that gas
may also escape from the pipeline is to forget... that when said
escape is provoked, it is an illicit act, whilst he who attracts the
clientele of a third party (when the modalities that qualify the
competition as illicit do not occur) executes a licit act (and, I will
add, fortunately as progress would cease with the monopoly of
clientele).
Although it is true that the clientele, in accordance with Article
648 (II) of the Commercial Code, is one of the "elements" of the
enterprise," under Honduran law, it does not constitute a "good."
Nor is it the subject of an absolute right of ownership. On the
contrary, it is an abstract term that has an economic value and a
juridic meaning.'7 It is symbolic of the habitual flow of purchasers or
users to a commercial establishment, separate from the individuality
of those that compose it. It constitutes, therefore, one of the
externalizations, or if preferred, a factor of the "aviamiento," that
constitutes a non-tangible quality of the enterprise and not a tangible
good. 8 For these reasons it cannot appear as an asset on the balance
sheet of the merchant.19
For the aforesaid reasons we agree with Rodrfgues and
Rodrfgues,2 ° in that:
disloyal competition supposes, necessarily, an act that
[improperly diverts] the clientele, as it is in the public that goes
to an enterprise to obtain merchandise or services where the
"aviamiento" is clearly [externalized]; it is a right that protects,
not the clientele as such, but the enterprise as a whole, and as
17. Garrigues, supra note 11 at 170,293.
18. Laureano F. Gutirrrez Falla. El Derecho Mercantil, LA EMPRESA, Vol. I, at
42, 57.
19. Unless it is one of the items included in the acquisition price of an enterprise,
in which case, in accordance with Article 438 III of the Commercial Code it cannot be
calculated for a value in excess of its acquisition or cost and should be amortized
annually within a period not to exceed five years.
20. CURSO DE DERECHO MERCANTIL, (Editorial Porrtia, 5a. ed., Mexico (1964) at
443.
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part of same, its capacity to make money, that constitutes its
"aviamiento."
In considering the term "clientele" as used in the first paragraph
of Article 425 of the Commercial Code and as defined above, the
question remains: What are the "improper" acts that the Commercial
Code considers as "unduly" attracting the clientele of another
merchant? Different concepts have been used in comparative law.
Article 1 of the German Law Against Disloyal Competition of
1909, described it as: "acts contrary to honest uses." Article 2598 of
the Italian Civil Code used the term "principles of professional
correctness," a concept that, according to Messineo,2" was based on
the "honest uses of commerce" of the International Convention of
Paris-Hague, and that it includes those acts which, by their nature, are
contrary to ethics (or customs), a zone of contact between ethics and
the law. Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Disloyal Competition defines
it as "all conduct that produces results objectively contrary to the
requirements of good faith."
All these principles are, we believe, applicable to Honduran
legislation in that, as the "Exposici6n de Motivos" of the Commercial
Code establishes:
[I]t was considered convenient to regulate two aspects of
professional activities of the merchants: the one that refers to
the necessary union between commercial activity and the public
good, and that which refers to the duty to compete with loyalty,
based on the requirements of a minimum ethical conduct.
Therefore, an "improper act of disloyal competition" would be
one that violates the principle of "loyalty" as applied to the minimum
ethical requirements. As Baylos Carroza put it, "disloyal competition
basically results in an exorbitant anomalous gain that does not
correspond to the effort of the merchant."22
The Honduran Commercial Code contains an Article that helps
explain these abstract concepts. Article 422 of the Commercial Code
states:
Merchants must exercise their professional activities in accord-
ance with the law and commercial uses and customs without
damaging the public, the national economy and without
violating socially accepted mores.
21. Messineo, supra note 7, vol. VI, at 576.
22. HERMENEGILDO, TRATADO DE DERECHO INDUSTRIAL, (Editorial Civitas,
Madrid, 1978) at 261.
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The violation of this obligation for the purpose of competing
permits the injured party to request the cessation of the illegal
conduct, and the payment of the damages he may have suffered.
This rule of law not only serves as a parameter to identify acts
that violate the "law of competition," but undoubtedly characterizes
the "improper" acts of Article 425; a classification that, in many cases,
would depend on the opinion of the judge ruling on the case.
What are the elements that these "improper" acts should
contain? Following Gacharna,23 in part, the act must comply with the
following requirements.
A. It Must be an Act of Competition
This means that it must be capable of promoting or assuring the
knowledge by the consumer public of the merchants' goods or
services, or must cause alterations in the behavior or economic
decisions in the marketplace.24 But, as Gacharna stated:
[Flor this requirement to be met it is not necessary that the
author of the illegal act actually have his own clientele, for he
who is only in the initial stages of his commercial activities is,
from that moment, the potential competitor of those who
already have entered the market place; therefore, he may be an
author of acts of improper competition, if he tries to obtain the
existing clientele of others by illegal means; as he may also be
protected against acts of disloyal competition, as a victim of
same, if his future competitors execute illegal acts with the
object of stopping him from obtaining his own clientele.25
B. The Act Must be "Improper"
In considering what is improper, as described above, it is
necessary to stress that in the execution of the act, the element of
subjective "animus" does not intervene. Therefore, even when the
transgressor has acted in good faith, his acts would be considered as
disloyal competition if they meet the statutory requirements. The
element of damage is unnecessary (as would be the case if the rules of
extracontractual liability were applied) because the potential of
damage to a clientele of another competitor is sufficient. The right to
23. Consuelo Garcharna, supra note 5, at 52.
24. See Acevedo, supra note 4, at 497.
25. Consuelo Gacharna, supra note 5.
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loyal competition is a subjective right of the merchant and, therefore,
protected against any act that improperly attacks it.
VI. Defenses of the Affected Merchant
The merchant or professional associations affected by an act of
disloyal competition may assert their rights in two different areas: in
the criminal field and in the civil field.
A. In the Criminal Field
Article 299(3) of the Penal Code (modified by Decree 59-97),
considers that acts of disloyal competition under the Commercial
Code and other special laws or international conventions, constitute
felonies against the economy. Accordingly, violations subject the
offender to sanctions including sentences of improsonment for three
to six years and fines from Lps. 50,000.00 to Lps. 1,000,000.
Additionally, if the acts of disloyal competition cause damages,
the injured party has the right to invoke Article 105 of the Penal
Code. A party who commits a crime in violation of Article 105, may
be held liable to the injured party for civil damages. Under Article
107 of the Penal Code, the injured party may be entitled to restitution
or repair of the material damages, indemnity for loss of profits and
moral damages under Article 110. Moral damages are determined by
the judge and may consist of economic indemnity as measured by the
circumstances of the infraction, the conditions of the persons involved
and the nature and consequences suffered, or which the injured party
could potentially suffer.
B. In the Civil Field
Articles 427 et seq. of the Commercial Code regulate the means
by which a merchant affected by acts of disloyal competition may
assert his rights. The action covers three different stages.
1) A preparatory measure consisting of the exhibition or
deposit of all the objects that serve as proof of the acts of disloyal
competition or of a sufficient number of same. A security bond,
however, must be filed by the damaged party to guarantee the
payment by the plaintiff of the damages he might have caused the
defendant if his claim is adjudged unfounded. This preparatory type
of measure is usually utilized in cases in which, for example, the
disloyal merchant used containers or labels that attributed the
appearance of genuineness to a falsified or adulterated product.
20011
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2) A request for the cessation of the act of disloyal
competition. This would involve an action that, we believe, could be
included within the precautionary measure of prohibiting the
execution of acts or contracts on determined goods, and would
involve following the procedures established in the Code of Civil
Proceedings.
3) A claim for the damages or loss of profits caused by the act
of disloyal competition. A damages claim may include, as in the case
of criminal jurisdiction, indemnity for moral damages if substantiated.
Actions for civil relief must be exercised under the rules of
ordinary procedure before a court of civil jurisdiction.
C. Election of the Action
Article 25 of the Code of Criminal Proceedings clearly indicates
that a claim for damages arising from a felony may be initiated either
before a judge who is competent to rule on the criminal procedure or
before a judge of competent civil jurisdiction. Notwithstanding,
Article 25 provides that any procedure for civil indemnity cannot be
initiated before a condemnatory sentence has been declared in a
criminal proceeding.
Article 25 is complemented by Article 194 of the Code of Civil
Proceedings. Article 194 requires that if judge or tribunal of civil
jurisdiction were to base its holding exclusively on the existence of a
felony, and after having heard the district attorney's opinion, the
judge considers it necessary to initiate the criminal proceeding, then
he must suspend the civil judgment until the criminal proceedings
have been terminated. Taking the aforesaid into account, may a
merchant or professional association affected by an act of disloyal
competition initiate and resolve its pleading in the civil jurisdiction
without the need of using the criminal jurisdiction?
We believe that Honduran law permits the affected merchant to
choose either the criminal or the civil jurisdiction. The wording of
Article 299 of the Penal Code recognizes as a felony the commission
of an act of disloyal competition under the terms of the Commercial
Code. This rule seems to emphasize the commercial nature of the
infraction and therefore, the possibility of bringing action based on
the civil aspects of the disloyal competitive act without entering into
the criminal field.
Nevertheless, we accept that, as there is, to our knowledge, no
Honduran precedent for this conclusion, it would be a matter for
resolution through future Honduran jurisprudence.
[Vol. 106:1
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VII. Disloyal Competition in the Proposed Law
Article 1 of the Proposed Law provides that it will be enacted to
protect and promote the process of free competition in the market
place through the prevention and elimination of monopolies,
monopolistic practices, monopsonies, oligopolies, hoarding and other
restrictions on the efficient functioning of the market for goods and
services. Further, Article 3 of the Proposed law prohibits any act or
contract that restricts, diminishes, damages, impedes or which in any
other manner, violates free economic competition in the production,
processing, distribution, supply or commercialization of goods and
services.
The above mentioned rules clearly indicate that the protected
interest under the Proposed Law is the "market," and this encom-
passes the national economy in all its phases, including consumers.
Despite this, Massaguer26 states:
[D]isloyal competition is not a law enacted in defense of
consumers and users as such, and is not, therefore, an adequate
forum to obtain, through its interpretation, an answer to the
social-juridic problems that arise in the traffic of goods and
services between merchants and consumers due to their
undeniable inequality.
The presence of the consumer in the regulation of disloyal
competition should not be used to establish objectives other than
those that the law itself permits: the protection of competition itself."
The Proposed Law includes in Title II "Of Acts and Practices
Restrictive to Competition," Chapter III provisions which regulate
acts of disloyal competition. These specify in Article 15 that, without
excluding those contemplated in the Commercial Code, acts of
disloyal competition are those which create confusion, deception,
denigration, imitation, exploitation of a third party's reputation,
violation of secrets, inducement to breach contracts, violation of legal
precepts, discrimination and publicity that in a direct or indirect
manner implies falsehood, inexactitude, obscurity, omission, ambig-
uities, exaggeration or any other circumstances that could induce the
consumer to deception, error or confusion with respect to products or
services offered in commercial transactions, comparative publicity
26. Quoted in Acevedo, supra note 4.
27. Cf. Rogelio P6rez-Bustamante, Lecci6n Inaugural Fundamentos Hist6ricos y
Jurdicos del Derecho de la Competencia en la Uni6n Europea y de Espaha in
DERECHO DE LA COMPETENCIA EUROPEA Y ESPA&ZOLA, (Dykinson, ed. Madrid) at 17




being allowed if and when it is not deceptive, does not create
confusion and does not discredit, denigrate or underrate. 8 Even
though the aforesaid regulations include factual situations recognized
by the Commercial Code as examples of disloyal competition,29 there
exists a great difference between the disloyal competition of the
Commercial Code, which, as we have already stated, is based on the
individualistic, professional or corporative theory of the institution,
and the Proposed Law which, to the contrary, is based on the social
model. According to Acevedo," the social model protects three basic
interests: a) The individual interests of the merchants; b) The
collective interests of the consumers; and c) The public interest of the
State to preserve the market.
31
[T]he construction of the competitive illicitude integrates the
interests of all those who expect to obtain their economic
objective and the satisfaction of their economic and social needs
in and through the market place, considered both individually as
well as collectively. In this fashion, the new discipline of disloyal
competition is no longer a mechanism to resolve conflicts
between competitors; it is consolidated as a mechanism to order
and control competitors.
Bercovitz states that the prohibition of disloyal competition has now
become the prohibition to act incorrectly in the market place.32 The
requirement of loyal competition has been replaced by the principle
of correction in the economic traffic.
Therefore, once the Proposed Law has been enacted, Honduras
will have two intimately related yet conceptually and procedurally
different regulations governing disloyal competition. One regime
being the Commercial Code's regulation of the competitive relations
between merchants, whose protected interest is the merchant's enter-
prise itself. The other being the Proposed Law, enacted to protect the
market. The latter entails, as Libonato well stated, "guaranteeing that
competition is constantly guarded, excluding, at least, explicit or de
facto barriers," 33 because, in the words of Adam Smith, the liberal
28. The Proposed Law defines each of these circumstances in the aforesaid
Article.
29. See Gutinrrez Falla, supra note 6. These situations are also recognized by the
rules of consumer protection on illicit publicity.
30. Acevedo, supra note 4, at 496.
31. Massaguer, quoted in Acevedo, supra note 4.
32. Quoted in Acevedo, supra note 4.
33. Bernardino, Ordine Juridico e Legge Economica Dell Mercato, Riv. Soc.
Aro 43/1998, at 1554-59.
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State is "more than that of laissez faire in its most trivial meaning," it
must always construct and preserve the market place.34
Nevertheless, as is the case of the Commercial Code, disloyal
competition under the Proposed Law only requires the mere
existence of the factual situation covered by the Proposed Law
without considering the good or bad faith of the offending party.
Conclusion
What are the basic differences between disloyal competition as
regulated in the Commercial Code and in the Proposed Law? In
addition to the different procedures used in their application, they
are conceptually based on two different principles.
Disloyal competition under the Commercial Code is defined as
those acts by which a merchant improperly attracts the clientele of
another merchant. Merchants are both the active and passive subjects
of disloyal competition, and the protected interest is the enterprise.
On the other hand, disloyal competition under the Proposed Law
applies to all persons, both natural and juridic, public or private,
national or foreign, with or without animus lucrandi, who undertake
economic activities in all or part of the national territory, including
those persons not legally domiciled in Honduras who execute
economic activities outside of the country insofar as such acts,
activities or agreements produce effects in the national market.
35
Therefore, the Proposed Law is applicable to all natural or
juridic persons who directly or indirectly, through their acts, whether
executed with or without animus lucrandi, affect the proper operation
of, and competition within, the marketplace. As Lara Ferreiro stated:
34. A typical example of this type of legislation was the U.S. Sherman Antitrust
Act of July 1890, which provides in Section 1: "Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal." Section 2
provides that "every person who shall monopolize, or intend to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with another person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor." The Clayton Antitrust Act of October 15, 1914 completes
the rules of law on protection of competition under the U.S. law.
In Europe, Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome of the European
Economic Communities, forbade two types of restrictions on competition. Article
85 prohibits all agreements between enterprises and the decisions of association of
enterprises and agreements on practices that may affect commerce between the
member states whose purpose or effect is to impede, restrict or falsify competition
within the Common Market. Article 86, considers incompatible with the Common
Market and therefore prohibited, the exploitation by one or more enterprises of a
dominant position in the market or in a substantial part of same.
35. Article 2 of the Proposed Law.
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[T]he defense against disloyal competition is not conceived, at
this date, in our legal system as a sector of the juridic body
directed to resolve conflicts between competitors but, as an
instrument of order and control of the conduct of the operators
in the market, be they merchants, artisans, farmers or members
of the liberal professions, the law not requiring the existence of
a direct competitive relationship between the parties.36
On the one hand, it is true that in Article 15, the Proposed Law
identifies acts of disloyal conduct "without excluding those of the
Commercial Code." The reference to the Commercial Code is not for
the purpose of applying to the disloyal competition under the
Proposed Law the same principles that govern disloyal competition in
the Commercial Code. Instead, the purpose is to recognize that the
factual situations contemplated in Article 425 of the Commercial
Code are, as well, factual situations covered by the Proposed Law.
Moreover, under the Proposed Law, the juridically protected interest
and the parties authorized to act in accordance with it are totally
different than those of the disloyal competition of the Commercial
Code.
As a result, the Proposed Law does not require that the
questionable act lure away the clientele of another, because the
Proposed Law is not intended to defend the enterprise of a particular
merchant. Instead, the Proposed Law has the much broader purpose
of protecting the market place. This is similar to the approach
outlined in the preamble to the Spanish Law of Disloyal Competition
(Law 3/1991 January 10):
[T]his law introduces a radical change in the traditional concept
of disloyal competition. It is no longer conceived as a regulation
directed primarily to resolve conflicts between merchants, but
broadens its sphere of application to become an instrument to
assure order and control in the conduct of the market.
Competition itself becomes, therefore, the direct object of the
protection. The new orientation and discipline broadens the
protection of the Spanish law to include the interests that
traditionally eluded the attention of commercial legislators. The
new law, in effect, protects not only the private interests of the
merchants in conflict, but also the collective interests of the
consumer.
Nevertheless, the acts that typify disloyal competition, whether
analyzed under the Commercial Code or under the Proposed Law,
36. Francisco Javier, Diferencia de la Competencia Desleal in DERECHO DE LA
COMPETENCIA EUROPEA Y ESPAf4OLA at 297.
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also typify acts prohibited by other legislation such as the Industrial
Property Law, Rights of Authors, Consumer Protection and the Penal
Code. Lawmakers and scholars studying modem commercial law are
faced with a body of law that regulates the massive traffic of goods
and services in the market place, and that rotates on the two
frequently antagonistic but always complementary poles of producer
and consumer. The analysis of any institution of a commercial nature
requires the investigator to take into account the regulations that
coincide on the same issues. Therefore, to properly analyze and study
modem commercial law and the nature of commercial institutions,
the investigator must take into account all the regulatory acts
coinciding on issues common to all. Notwithstanding that the
economic system now predominant in Honduras is that of a market
economy, those regulations, when duly coordinated, must seek the
same fundamental objective expressly recognized by the Honduran
Constitution. The primary and fundamental principle of all
regulations, regardless of underlying intent, is to obtain "a state of law
that assures a political, economic and socially just society, which
affirms the nationality and propitiates the conditions for the full
realization of man as a human person."
2001]

